Vildirect: IncomeTax-caselaws-1994-VIL-245-BOM-DT

1994-VIL-245-BOM-DT

Equivalent Citation: [1995] 213 ITR 805, 126 CTR 205, 81 TAXMANN 348

BOMBAY HIGH COURT

Date: 22.11.1994

SMT. VASANTIBAI N. SHAH

COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX

BENCH

Judge(s) : S. M. JHUNJHUNUWALA., DR. B. P. SARAF

JUDGMENT

The judgment of the court was delivered by

DR. B. P. SARAF J.---By this reference under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, made at the instance of the assessee, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has referred the following questions to this court for opinion :

" 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the scheme of Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Ordinance, 1975, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the Income-tax Officer had reason to believe that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act by reason of the declaration made by the applicant under section 14(1) of the Ordinance ?

2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in holding that the Income-tax Officer was justified in reopening the assessment under section 147(b) when the Income-tax Officer had purported to reopen the assessment specifically under section 147(a) ?

3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that what was disclosed by the applicant in the course of the original assessment proceedings in respect of the two jackpot amounts of Rs. 78,799 and Rs. 8,66,040 was not a full and true disclosure within the meaning of clause (a) of section 147 of the Income-tax Act in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in CIT v. Burlop Dealers Ltd. [1971] 79 ITR 609 and ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. [1979] 118 ITR 1 ?

4. Whether having regard to the information and evidence concerning the amounts of Rs. 78,799 and Rs. 8,66,040 supplied by the applicant in the original assessment proceedings, the Tribunal was right in law, in an appeal from the reassessment under section 147(a)/143(3), to reconsider the said items and give a finding contrary to or inconsistent with the one in the original assessment proceedings following an order of the Tribunal in the case of another assessee and then hold that the items satisfied the criteria laid down in section 147(a), in view of the decisions in CIT v. Burlop Dealers Ltd. [1971] 79 ITR 609 (SC) ; New Kaiser-I-Hind Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1977] 107 ITR 760 (Bom) and ITO v. Madnani Engineering Works Ltd. [1979] 118 ITR 1 (SC) ?

5. Whether the finding of the Tribunal that the applicant did not win the two jackpot amounts of Rs. 78,799 and Rs. 8,66,040 but only purchased the winning tickets on payment of premium to the actual winners was vitiated in law by reason of its being based on surmises and conjectures and on a Tribunal's order in the case of a different assessee for a different assessment year in the original assessment proceedings and ignoring the material on record in the form of assessee's statement, winning slips and payment by R. W. I. T. C. by account payee cheques ?

6. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in sustaining the addition of Rs. 10 lakhs as the assessee's undisclosed income invested in the purchase of jackpot winning tickets ? "

The assessee is an individual. For the assessment year 1971-72, the assessee submitted the return of her income under the Income-tax Act, 1961, showing an income of Rs. 6,923. In Part IV of the return the assessee disclosed under the head "Sums not included in Part I and claimed to be not taxable" jackpot and race winnings, the details of which are as follows:

Rs.

R.W.I.T.C. receipt No. A-4562, dated December 1, 1970 78,799

R.W.I.T.C. receipt No. A-7301, dated December 27, 1970 8,66,040

Cash 470

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9,45,309

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Assessment was made by the Income-tax Officer on the basis of this return on February 11, 1974, and the total income was determined at Rs. 7,393 (rupees seven thousand three hundred and ninety three). It appears that after the assessment was made, some time in October, 1974, there was a search in the premises of the assessee under section 132 of the Act. In the meantime, the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Ordinance, 1975, was promulgated to provide for voluntary disclosure of income and wealth. The said Ordinance was later replaced by the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Act, 1976. Section 14(1) of the said Act permitted any person, in a case where any books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles or things belonging to him had been seized as a result of search under section 132 of the Income-tax Act, to make a disclosure on or after the date of commencement of the said Act but before the first day of January, 1976, by a declaration in accordance with sub-section (2) thereof in respect of any income relating to the previous year in which such search was made or in any earlier previous year which he had failed to disclose in the return of income furnished by him under the Income-tax Act before the commencement of the said Act or which had escaped assessment by reason of omission or failure on the part of such person to make a return under the Income-tax Act or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment or otherwise. In pursuance of the provisions of section 14(1) of the said Ordinance, the assessee made a declaration on December 31, 1975, wherein she disclosed an undisclosed income for the assessment year 1971-72 of Rs. 25,000 on account of investment in furniture, fixtures and fittings in a flat in Empire Estate and two air-conditioners in Tardeo Air-conditioned Market in Flat No. 28, Shakti Sadan. Similarly, disclosures were also made for the assessment years 1973-74 and 1974-75.

In the course of proceedings for the assessment of the wealth of the assessee for the assessment years 1971-72 and 1972-73, the Income-tax Officer noticed certain investments made by the assessee in immovable property, the nature and source of which had not been explained by the assessee with reference to her declared source of income despite being asked to do so by the Income-tax Officer, vide letters written from time to time. The Income-tax Officer also received a copy of the declaration made by the assessee under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act which was forwarded to him by the Commissioner as required by sub-section (4) thereof. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, reopened the assessment of the assessee under section 147(a) of the Act by issue of notice under section 148. In response to the said notice, the assessee filed a return disclosing a total income of Rs. 32,393, Rs. 7,393 being the income originally assessed plus Rs. 25,000 representing the amount disclosed by the assessee under section 14(1) of the Voluntary Disclosure Ordinance, The Income-tax Officer after giving an opportunity of hearing to the assessee made the assessment under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act wherein he added a further sum of Rs. 27,000 being the value of furniture and jewellery and a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs shown as race winnings over and above the income disclosed by the assessee. The above assessment was made on July 20, 1977.

The assessee appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the reopening of the assessment under section 147(a) was without jurisdiction and, hence, deleted the additions made by the Income-tax Officer. The Revenue appealed to the Tribunal against the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. It was contended by the Revenue that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was not justified in holding that reopening of assessment under section 147(a) of the Act was without jurisdiction. It was also contended that there was no justification for deletion of the sum of Rs. 10 lakhs added by the Income-tax Officer on account of unexplained investment in the purchase of jackpot winning tickets. With regard to the first submission of the assessee, the Tribunal referred to the provisions of section 14(4) of the Voluntary Disclosure Ordinance (later Act) which specifically says that information contained in any declaration made under the said Act may be taken into account for the purpose of proceedings relating to assessment or reassessment of income. The Tribunal, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and section 14(4) of the Voluntary Disclosure Ordinance, held that the Income-tax Officer was justified in reasonably believing that the assessee's income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment within the meaning of section 147(a) of the Act and initiating proceedings under that section accordingly. The Tribunal also considered on the merits the correctness of the addition of the sum of Rs.10 lakhs by the Income-tax Officer as unexplained investment in purchase of jackpot winnings. The Tribunal referred to its own decision in the assessee's husband's case where on consideration of various jackpot winnings of the husband as also of the assessee, it had held by its order dated April 7, 1977, that the jackpot winnings were not by the assessee or by her husband but were purchases of such winnings from the actual winners on payment of premium and, therefore, the estimated amount paid for purchase of such jackpot tickets could be treated as the assessee's investment, which in the absence of any explanation regarding its nature and source, could be treated as the assessee's income, The Tribunal rejected the contention of the assessee that the alleged jackpot winnings having been disclosed in Part IV of the return originally filed by the assessee it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to re-examine the same and to bring it to tax and held that in the facts and circumstances of the case the Income-tax Officer was fully justified in adding the sum of Rs. 10 lakhs to the income of the assessee. The Tribunal, therefore, set aside the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and confirmed the order of the Income-tax Officer. The assessee has therefore come by way of reference to this court with the questions of law set out above.

We have heard learned counsel for the assessee, Mr. Dwarkadas, as also learned counsel for the Revenue, Dr. Balasubramaniam, at length. According to learned counsel for the assessee, the assessment has been reopened in the instant case on the basis of the declaration made by the assessee under section 14(1) of the Act which has been treated as information by the Income-tax Officer. According to learned counsel, the disclosure made under the provisions of this Act can be used only for the purpose of assessment to include the income declared by an assessee and not for bringing to tax any other income which is not the subject-matter of the declaration. Reliance was placed on various clauses of the Voluntary Disclosure Act, to which we shall refer a little later, which makes the declaration under the said Act not admissible in evidence against a declarant and also provides for secrecy of the declaration in certain cases. Our attention was also drawn to section 16 of the Act which gives certain immunities to a declarant. The submission of Mr. Dwarkadas, learned counsel for the assessee, in brief was that a declaration made under section 14(1) of the Act cannot constitute information for the purpose of reopening of assessment within the meaning of clause (a) of section 147 of the Act. His further submission was that the race course winnings having been shown by the assessee in the original return in Part IV as income exempt from tax and the Income-tax Officer having acted upon the same, it is not open to the Income-tax Officer to re-examine the same on the basis of any information coming to his possession subsequently as it would amount to a mere change of opinion. According to learned counsel, the assessee having disclosed the income in its return, it was for the Income-tax Officer to examine at the time of assessment, the truthfulness or correctness of the same and if he failed to do so at that time, he cannot do so later by taking resort to proceedings under section 147(a) of the Act. It was also submitted that jackpot winnings were not the specific subject-matter for reopening and hence the same cannot be considered for the purpose of reassessment in pursuance of the notice issued by the Income-tax Officer under section 148 of the Act.

We have carefully considered the above submissions. From the statement of the case, we find that the Income-tax Officer in the course of proceedings for wealth-tax assessment for the years 1971-72 and 1972-73 noticed certain investments in immovable property, the nature and source of which the assessee failed to explain despite letters from the Income-tax Officer asking her to do so. The Income-tax Officer also received a copy of the declaration made by the assessee under section 14(1) of the Voluntary Disclosure Act of 1976 from the Commissioner of Income-tax as provided under section 14(4) of the said Act. It is evident from the above that the declaration made by the assessee under sub-section (1) of section 14 was not the only basis for initiation of proceedings under section 147(a) of the Act. Initiation was made on the basis of the information in the possession of the Income-tax Officer regarding unexplained investments in immovable property in the assessment year under consideration and the subsequent assessment year as also the declaration made by the assessee. According to the assessee, the declaration made under section 14(1) cannot form the basis for reopening of the assessment as such except for the purpose of bringing to tax the amount declared thereby.

To appreciate the above contention, it would be expedient to refer to the scheme of the Voluntary Disclosure of Income and Wealth Act, 1976. On November 20, 1975, an ordinance was promulgated by the President to provide for voluntary disclosure of income and wealth and matters connected therewith. The said Ordinance was later replaced by the above Act. Section 3 of the Act provides for assessment of the income declared by a person in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of the said Act for any assessment year referred to as "voluntarily disclosed income" at the rate or rates specified in the said Schedule. Section 4 provides that the declaration under sub-section (1) of section 3 should be made to the Commissioner and the income-tax payable in respect of the voluntarily disclosed income should be paid by the declarant before making the declaration and the declaration should be accompanied by proof of payment of such tax. Section 8 says that the amount of voluntarily disclosed income would not be included in the total income of the declarant for any assessment year under the Income-tax Act or any of the Acts mentioned therein on fulfilment of the conditions specified therein. It also provides for grant of a certificate by the Commissioner to the declarant setting forth the particulars of the voluntarily disclosed amount, the amount of income-tax paid by him, etc. Section 9 makes it clear that voluntarily disclosed income would not affect the finality of completed assessments, etc. Section 14 of the Act provides for declaration of income by persons in cases of search and seizure. In such cases also, a declaration may be made by an assessee and tax paid on such declared income at the rates specified in the Schedule to that Act. Sub-section (4) of section 14 requires the Commissioner to forward a copy of the declaration made by the declarant under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act to the Income-tax Officer. It also provides that information contained therein may be taken into account for the purposes of proceedings relating to assessment or reassessment of the income of the declarant under the provisions of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of the said Act which includes the Income-tax Act. Section 14, so far as material, is set out below :

" 14. Disclosure of income in cases of search and seizure.--(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where any books of account, other documents, money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable articles or things, belonging to a person have been seized as a result of a search under section 132 of the Income-tax Act or section 37A of the Wealth-tax Act and such person (hereafter in this section referred to as 'the declarant') makes, on or after the date of commencement of this Act but before the 1st day of January, 1976, a declaration in accordance with sub-section (2) in respect of any income relating to the previous year in which such search was made or any earlier previous year,--

(a) for which he has failed to furnish a return under section 139 of the Income-tax Act, or

(b) which he has failed to disclose in a return of income furnished by him under the Income-tax Act before the commencement of this Act, or

(c) which has escaped assessment by reason of the omission or failure on the part of such person to make a return under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), or the Income-tax Act, or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment or otherwise,

then, notwithstanding anything contained in any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 8 or the Wealth-tax Act, the amount of income so declared or, as the case may be, the value of the assets representing such income, shall not be taken into account for the purposes of--

(i) payment of interest by the declarant under sub-section (8) of section 139 of the Income-tax Act ;

(ii) payment of interest by the declarant under section 215 or section 217 of the Income-tax Act or the corresponding provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (11 of 1922) ;

(iii) imposition of penalty on the declarant under the provisions of any of the said Acts, except under section 221 of the Income-tax Act or the corresponding provisions of any of the other said Acts ; and

(iv) prosecution of the declarant under the provisions of any of the said Acts.

(2) The declaration under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Commissioner and shall be in such form and shall be verified in such manner as may be prescribed by rules made by the Board.

(3) A declaration under this section shall be signed by the person specified in sub-section (2) of section 4 as if the declaration had been made under that section.

(4) A copy of the declaration made by the declarant under sub-section (1) shall be forwarded by the Commissioner to the Income-tax Officer and the information contained therein may be taken into account for the purposes of the proceedings relating to assessment or reassessment of the income of the declarant under the provisions of any of the Acts mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 8 or the Wealth-tax Act.

(5) The immunity provided under sub-section (1) shall not be available to the declarant unless the tax chargeable in respect of the income of the previous year or years for which the declaration has been made is paid by the declarant in accordance with the provisions of section 5. . . . "

Evidently, the Legislature thought it fit to make it clear to the assessees making disclosure of income that in cases of search and seizure, copies of the declarations made by them and the information furnished therein would be forwarded to the Income-tax Officer and such information might be taken into account for the purpose of proceedings relating to assessment or reassessment of the income of the declarant. The assessee who makes a declaration gets immunity only in respect of the amount declared by him/her but the immunity extends no further. The amount so declared is not includible in the normal assessment of the assessee. It is assessable at the special rate prescribed by the Voluntary Disclosure Act. It is not one of those voluntary disclosure schemes which contemplates reopening of the original assessment to include income declared by an assessee in the income already assessed for the purpose of determining the rate of tax or liability. This Act provides for assessment of the assessed income separately without disturbing or in any way affecting the assessment already made at the rates specified in the Schedule to the said Act and to give immunity to the declarant in respect of the amount so declared to the extent mentioned in sections 8 and 16 of the Act. Section 8 provides that the voluntarily disclosed income would not be included in the total income of the assessee. Section 16 gives immunity to the declarant from penalty and prosecution. The submission of learned counsel for the assessee is that sub-section (4) of section 14 enables the Income-tax Officer to use the information contained in the declaration as information for the purpose of reopening of assessments under section 147 of the Act only for the limited purpose of including the income declared by the declarant in his assessment if already made is misconceived as the Voluntary Disclosure Act does not require any assessment to be reopened to assess the income declared in the declaration under this Act. This Act enables the declarant to make a declaration and to pay the tax at the rates specified in the Schedule to that Act and on the same being accepted, gives an immunity to the declarant from inclusion of such income in his total income. The very purpose of sub-section (4) of section 14 is to enable the Income-tax Officer to reopen an assessment on the basis of the information contained in the declaration made under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act if he finds that despite the declaration made, any income remains unassessed or underassessed. The Income-tax Officer in the instant case was, therefore, correct in reopening the assessment on the basis of the information in his possession including the information contained in the declaration made by the assessee under section 14(1) and the Tribunal was justified in confirming the action of the Income-tax Officer under section 147(a) of the Act. Having regard to the above, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue.

So far the controversy raised in the second question is concerned, it is well-settled by now that once an assessment is validly reopened by issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act, the previous underassessment is set aside and the Income-tax Officer has jurisdiction and a duty to levy tax on the entire income that had escaped during the previous year. The Income-tax Officer in the course of the proceedings under section 147 of the Act may bring to charge items of income which had escaped assessment other than or in addition to the item or items which relate to the issuance of notice under section 148. So far as the disclosure of the jackpot winnings by the assessee in Part IV of the original return is concerned, the Income-tax Officer will have the jurisdiction under section 147(a) of the Act despite such disclosure if he is of the opinion that such disclosure was not a full and true disclosure. The submission of learned counsel for the assessee that the Income-tax Officer having examined the said disclosure in the original return, could not take resort to section 147 of the Act even if he comes into possession of any information to the effect that the said declaration was not true as it would amount to a change of opinion, cannot be accepted in view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal v. ITO [1993] 203 ITR 456, where interpreting the expression "true and full disclosure" appearing in section 147 of the Act, it was held that where the transaction itself, on the basis of subsequent information, is found to be a bogus transaction, the mere disclosure of that transaction at the time of original assessment proceedings cannot be said to be a disclosure of the "true" and "full" facts in the case and the Income-tax Officer would have the jurisdiction to reopen the concluded assessment in such a case. The Supreme Court clearly said that it is correct that the assessing authority could have deferred the completion of the original assessment proceedings for further enquiry and investigation into the genuineness of the transaction but his failure to do so and completion of the original assessment proceedings would not take away his jurisdiction to act under section 147 of the Act, on receipt of the information subsequently. The Supreme Court also observed that one of the purposes of section 147 was to ensure that, the party cannot get away by wilfully making a false or untrue statement at the time of original assessment and when that falsity comes to notice, to turn around and say "you accepted my lie, now your hands are tied and you can do nothing". It was held that it would be a travesty of justice to allow the assessee that latitude. Having regard to the above decision of the Supreme Court, it is difficult to accept the contention of the assessee that having reopened the assessment on the basis of information with regard to certain statements, it was not open to the Income-tax Officer to bring to charge items which were not known to him at the time of original assessment. In the instant case in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, question No. 2 as such does not arise. Question No. 2, therefore, in our opinion, is academic and need not be answered in the form in which it has been framed. It will suffice to say that the Income-tax Officer was justified in bringing to tax the undisclosed income of the assessee which was sought to be shown as exempted income from jackpot winnings.

So far as question No. 3 is concerned, we find that the Tribunal was right in holding that what was disclosed by the assessee in the course of the original assessment proceedings in respect of the jackpot amounts of Rs. 78,799 and Rs. 8,66,040 was not a full and true disclosure within the meaning of clause (a) of section 147 of the Act particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Phool Chand Bajrang Lal's case [1993] 203 ITR 456. The facts of the case are glaring. The claim of jackpot winnings during the year was based on jackpot slips alleged to be in the name of the assessee for which cheques had been obtained from the race club. In her statement dated July 4, 1973, the assessee stated that she did not remember the names of the horses which won her Rs. 8,66,040. Her claim was that she was going to the races for the past ten years. She claims to have won jackpots totalling Rs. 9 lakhs within a fortnight on two occasions. The Income-tax Officer in the course of the wealth-tax assessment noticed disproportionate immovable properties in her name. In the statement recorded at the time of search operations under section 132 in October, 1974, the assessee did not make any mention of her having won any jackpot of such thumping amount. When she was asked what was the maximum win she had made in the races, she stated that she had won about Rs. 1 lakh. The assessee was not even able to say in what manner she collected this amount, whether it was by cheque or cash. When she was asked if she had any bank account, she said that she had no bank account anywhere. The Income-tax Officer, therefore, found that the statements made by the assessee in the course of the original assessment proceedings were worthless and meaningless and had to be disregarded as having no evidential value. The Income-tax Officer also noted that during the very same period the assessee's family had shown the following jackpot winnings within less than a year :

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Date Name of the assessee Amount of the alleged jackpot win

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(in Rs. Ps.)

1-12-1970 Smt. Vasantibai N. Shah 78,799.00

27-12-1970 -do- 8,66,040.00

27-1-1971 Shri Chaganlal P. Shah 1,73,610.50

29-1-1971 Smt. Delhibai Champalal Shah 1,73,610.50

22-2-1971 Shri Nainmal P. Shah 5,435.50

22-2-1971 -do- 5,435.50

16-12-1971 -do- 38,142.50

26-12-1971 Smt. Delhibai Champalal Shah 38,142.50

1-1-1972 -do- 14,849.50

2-1-1972 -do- 51,815.00

7-4-1972 Shri Nainmal P. Shah 5,451.00

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Total 14,51,331.50

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The Income-tax Officer noted that not only the major members of the assessee's family but the teenaged daughter of the assessee, Shantidevi, was also supposed to have won a substantial jackpot for herself shortly after her 18th birthday when she became a major. The Income-tax Officer also took note of the fact that the assessee's husband and her brother-in-law had also brought their ill-gotten wealth in the guise of jackpot winnings and have made declarations under the disclosure scheme. It was also noticed by the Income-tax Officer that in all the cases what had been produced in support of the winnings was merely a copy of the slip given by the race club when a person goes to claim the jackpot winning. The Income-tax Officer also took note of a number of cases where similar jackpot winnings claimed by the assessees were not accepted.

We have carefully considered the facts and circumstances of the case. From the various material brought on record by the Income-tax Officer, it is evident that the Income-tax Officer was justified in holding that the amount claimed to be received by the assessee at the races from jackpot winnings did not represent genuine race winnings. There was nothing improper on the part of the Income-tax Officer in relying on circumstantial evidence in such case for the purpose of arriving at the above finding inasmuch as no direct evidence in a transaction like this is ever possible. Learned counsel for the assessee submitted before us that the finding of the Income-tax Officer is based purely on supposition and surmises. His main grievance appears to be that the Income-tax Officer failed to bring on record any direct evidence to rebut the contention of the assessee that the amounts in question were jackpot winnings of the assessee. According to learned counsel, the jackpot slip and the cheque were the direct evidence produced by the assessee. We find it difficult to accept this submission because the Income-tax Officer is entitled under section 143(3) of the Act to ask an assessee to produce further evidence in support of the contention made in the course of the assessment proceedings. The Income-tax Officer is entitled to take into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and to draw his own inference on the basis thereof. Circumstantial evidence in such cases is not impermissible. In cases like this it is only the circumstantial evidence which will be available. No direct evidence can be expected. We have carefully perused the statement of the assessee made under section 132 of the Act with regard to the jackpot winnings, more particularly the statement that the biggest winning she had made was some time in the year 1974 to the tune of Rs. 1 lakh. We have also noted the total ignorance of the assessee about the races and also the fact that members of the family of the assessee had been showing income from jackpot winnings which were found to be false.

Under the circumstances, we are of the clear opinion that the finding of the Tribunal that the assessee did not win two jackpot amounts but purchased the winning tickets on payment of premium to the actual winners was not based on surmises and conjectures but on material on record, proper consideration which leads to the inevitable conclusion as arrived at by the Tribunal. In our opinion, the Tribunal was right in law in sustaining the additions made by the Income-tax Officer as the assessee's undisclosed income invested in the purchase of jackpot winning tickets. Having regard to the above, we answer questions Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Under the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.

Mr. Dwarkadas, learned counsel for the assessee applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that this is a fit case for grant of leave. Hence, leave rejected.

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